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This paper attempts to explain the variation in post-Maastricht elite attitudes 
toward EMU in Western Europe. It concentrates on the British reluctance to 
join the single currency early on as well as the French and German stubborn 
support for it. We argue that explanations based on solely material conceptions 
of actors' interests - whether economic or geopolitical - are indeterminate with 
regard to explaining the variation in attitudes. The Euro is about European 
union rather than just lowering transaction costs. Institutionalist accounts about 
path dependent processes, however, offer significant insights if they are linked 
to the more constructivist reasoning as developed in this article. The mam 
argument in this paper then holds that the visions about European order which 
give political meaning to EMU, need to be understood in the framework of 
identity politics. The controversies among the political elites in the three 
countries as well as the variation in attitudes can be explained by differences in 
the construction of national collective identities and their relationship to 
European order. Money has historically been closely linked to state- and nation­
building. The Euro is no exception. While the French and German political 
elites - from the center-right to the center-left - have incorporated "Europe" into 
their nationally defined collective identities, British policy-makers including 
New Labour remain hesitant. As a result, the continental European debates 
about the Euro have largely concentrated on the question when to join the single 






















































































































































































1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
The closer the European Union (EU) gets to the decision date in early 1998 
which countries will join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 
1, 1999, the more heated the debates about the political and economic merits of 
the "Euro” become all over Europe. Given the cuts in social welfare 
expenditures which governments imposed to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria together with feeble economic growth and high rates of unemployment, 
it is not surprising that public opinion in many member states is not particularly 
supportive of a common European currency. The net percentage in favor of the 
Euro is only 18% EU-wide, while the French public appears to be the only one 
among the "big three" (Britain, Germany, France) backing the single currency 
by a large majority. German public opinion is almost equally split, while a large 
majority of the British opposes the Euro.1 2*It is all the more remarkable that 
EMU is still on track and very likely to remain so. The political elites in most 
EU member states including the center-left continue to endorse the Euro despite 
grumblings here and there.
This paper attempts to explain the variation in post-Maastricht elite attitudes 
toward EMU in Western Europe. It concentrates on the British reluctance to 
join the single currency early on as well as the French and German stubborn 
support for it. While we do not focus on specific policy decisions, we try to 
account for the underlying preferences and general elite attitudes toward a 
single European currency.’ '
We argue, first, that explanations based on solely material conceptions of actors' 
interests - whether economic or geopolitical - are indeterminate with regard to 
explaining the variation in attitudes. These arguments need to be linked to
1 This is a thoroughly revised and updated version of an article first published as (Engelmann 
et al„ 1997). We thank the participants in the Finnish project, in particular Heikki Patomaki, 
for their insightful comments. We also thank Tanja Borzel, Martin Marcussen, Hans-Peter 
Schmitz, Cornelia Ulbert, Christoph Weller, two anonymous EUI reviewers, as well as audi­
ences at Columbia, Cornell, Georgetown, Oslo Universities, and the European University In­
stitute for their critical remarks. The article is part of a larger research project on "Ideas, In­
stitutions, and Political Culture: The Europeanization of National Identities" funded by the 
German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the European Univer­
sity Institute.
2 Eurobarometer survey, Oct.-Nov. 1996, quoted from The Economist, June 7, 1997, 25.
’This is not to suggest that elite and mass public opinion do not interact with each other and 
that there is no public influence on elite attitudes. However, this paper concentrates on the 
dynamics of elite opinion in the three countries. For an argument on the influence of mass 



























































































broader visions about European political order to explain the differences in 
attitudes and interests. The Euro is about European union rather than just 
lowering transaction costs. Second, institutionalist arguments about path 
dependent processes offer significant insights if they are linked to the more 
constructivist reasoning as developed in this article. Third, the main argument 
in this paper then holds that the visions about European order which give 
political meaning to EMU, need to be understood in the framework of identity 
politics. The controversies among the political elites in the three countries as 
well as the variation in attitudes can be explained by differences in the 
construction of national collective identities and their relationship to European 
order. Money has historically been closely linked to state- and nation-building 
(Helleiner, 1997). The Euro is no exception. While the French and German 
political elites - from the center-right to the center-left - have incorporated 
"Europe" into their nationally defined collective identities, British policy­
makers including New Labour remain hesitant. As a result, the continental 
European debates about the Euro have largely concentrated on the question 
when to join the single currency, while the British debate continues to discuss if 
joining was at all in the national interest.
The paper proceeds in the following steps. First, we discuss alternative 
explanations focussing on material conceptions of elite interests and on 
institutional path dependency. Second, we try to clarify some conceptual issues 
relating to the concept of collective national identities. Third, the empirical part 
of the paper analyzes collective identity construction among the political elites 
in the three countries investigated.
2. The Puzzle: Why is the Euro "locked in?"4
How is it to be explained that the Euro has survived all challenges since the 
Maastricht treaties were signed in 1991, including
• a near rejection by the French public in the 1992 referendum which would 
have certainly killed the treaties;
• the near collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992/93;
4 This paper does not try to explain the origins o f EMU. For competing accounts see 





























































































• the difficulties which most EU member states face in implementing the 
Maastricht convergence criteria requiring stiff austerity policies at times of 
sluggish economic growth and unprecedented levels of unemployment;
• high levels of opposition to the Euro in mass public opinion of the most 
important member states;
• the continuing grumbling among the German and French political elites?
The Indeterminacy of Economic Interests
A first-cut answer to the puzzle points to economic interests which traditional 
theories of European integration such as neofunctionalism or liberal 
intergovemmentalism see as the driving forces behind European integration 
(Cameron, 1997; Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1993). The single currency is, thus, 
seen as the logical follow-up to the European single market allowing for the free 
movement of goods, capital, labor, and services. The Euro would stop excessive 
currency fluctuations and protectionist pressures which could jeopardize the 
single market. The single currency would eliminate transaction costs (some 
estimate the savings at 0,5% of Europe's combined GDP) and might lead to 
increased investment. In sum, the Euro is supposed to be the answer to the 
increased economic interdependence among the EU member states and to the 
challenges of globalization.
A second look reveals that the economic arguments in favor of EMU are not 
that clear. Leading advocates of neoliberal economics disagree among 
themselves on the merits of a currency union in the absence of a political union 
or a common economic policy (Breuss, 1997; Eichengreen and Frieden, 1994; 
Eichengreen, von Hagen, and Harden, 1996; Hagen and Lutz, 1995; Sutter, 
1997). "Some argue that the European Central Bank will not be truly 
independent from political influence, while others maintain that inflationary 
pressures cannot be effectively resisted if there is no integrated economic policy 
and a political union. There is considerable disagreement among economists on 
what constitutes an "optimal currency area" and how much economic 
homogeneity has to be achieved for it.5
If we look at the economic preferences of individual countries, these interests 
alone do not appear to explain the variation in attitudes toward the Euro, either.
5 The European Commission forecast suggests that all EU member states except Greece will 
meet the Maastricht convergence criteria in 1997, thus qualifying in principle for EMU. See 




























































































In the British case, for example, one could argue that the decision not to join 
EMU in 1999 which was re-affirmed by the newly elected Labor government, 
reflects sound economic policies, since Great Britain's economic cycle is out of 
sync with continental Europe. But Britain is one of the few countries which 
would have no trouble meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria, particularly 
the budget deficit goal of no more than 3% of GDP. EMU also fits well in the 
neoliberal economic orientation of the British government which did not change 
much under Tony Blair, at least as compared to the continental European states. 
For years now, Britain has tried to attract foreign direct investment and to 
become a main production center for non-European multinationals in their 
efforts to enter the single market. The Euro would be attractive for these 
companies, since it lowers transaction costs and eliminates exchange rate 
instabilities. For similar reasons, British business elites including the city of 
London's financial have recently lobbied the Labour government to enter the 
Euro zone early.6
A similar indeterminacy holds for France. On the one hand, the French decision 
to join EMU can be explained by the fact that a common currency is preferable 
to the domination of the European Monetary System (EMS) by the Deutsche 
Mark. Control of French monetary policy by a supranational European Central 
Bank (ECB) rather than by the German Bundesbank can be regarded as the 
lesser of two evils. The EMU's convergence criteria helped the French 
government to legitimize its austerity policies and the reform of the French 
welfare state. On the other hand, though, this last point also shows the pitfalls of 
EMU for France (Schmidt, 1997). First, meeting the EMU convergence criteria 
constrains French economic policies even more than EMS ever did. Second, the 
stubborn support of the French Socialists for the single currency since 
Mitterrand's presidency is stunning. Lionel Jospin, the new prime minister, 
immediately forgot his campaign pledge to seek re-negotiation of EMU when he 
came into power. His reluctance to sign the "stability pact" at the 1997 
Amsterdam summit forcing the EMU members to continuously comply with the 
convergence criteria lasted less than a week.
If economic reasons for the British reluctance and the French support to joining 
a single currency are indeterminate, this is all the more true for the linchpin of 
the whole project, Germany. First, the German economy does not need a 
common currency, since the EMS already constitutes a Deutsche Mark zone. 
German industry conducts its European business predominantly in Deutsche 
Mark; the effects of a common currency on lowering German transaction costs 
are, thus, not very significant. Second, why should the Germans give up the




























































































EMS as a Deutsche Mark zone controlled by the Bundesbank in favor of the 
EMU and a supranational ECB, particularly after unification has increased 
German power? Third, the economic benefits of EMU for German business are 
unclear. One could argue that the Euro might increase German competitiveness 
on the global markets more than the Deutsche Mark ever could - provided, of 
course, that the Euro becomes a strong currency. But who knows? Fourth, even 
with the convergence criteria firmly enforced and the "stability pact" in place, it 
is still uncertain whether Germany's cherished economic policies of tight money 
and low inflation will survive EMU. Finally, the German SPD is in a similar 
position as the French PSF. Since German labor appears to be the loser of a 
strict application of the convergence criteria, the continuing Social Democratic 
support for EMU is counter-intuitive, particularly since the SPD is still in 
opposition.
In sum, we do not mean to argue that there are no economic reasons supporting 
a single currency for the European Union. The arguments with regard to lower­
ing transaction costs and to stabilizing expectations concerning currency 
fluctuations for business, on the one hand, and with regard to globalization 
pressures, on the other hand, seem to be particularly strong. However, these 
economic reasons as well as specific expressions of economic interests by 
political and business elites cannot account for the variation in national 
attitudes toward the Euro among the elites in the three countries. While we do 
not want to get into the details of neoliberal economics, suffice it to say that the 
economic costs and benefits of a common currency are still uncertain and 
depend on scope conditions which cannot be adequately predicted at this point. 
EMU is far from representing an obvious solution to Europe's economic 
problems and the economic pros and cons of a single European currency are 
indeterminate.
Do Geopolitical Reasons Provide an Answer?
One could argue from a realist perspective that European integration has always 
been as much about security concerns as about solving economic problems. 
Could this reasoning apply to EMU, too? Geopolitically speaking, the end of 
the Cold War brought the German problem back on the European agenda. The 
Maastricht treaties and EMU can, thus, be regarded as an effort to contain 
German power in Europe in the aftermath of unification by firmly binding the 
Federal Republic to Western institutions and by preventing a German 
Sonderweg (Grieco, 1995). Moreover, the single currency and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) effectively end the quasi-hegemony of the German 
Bundesbank over monetary policies in Europe. Indeed, such arguments have 




























































































historical reasons, the French elites - even more so than mass public opinion - 
have been obsessed with the German problem since the end of World War II 
and this obsession explains French attitudes toward European integration to 
some degree.
Three puzzles remain, however. First, if French support for EMU is to be 
explained by geopolitical considerations in terms of the "German problem," 
what about British reluctance to join in? Why should London be less concerned 
than Paris about German power after unification? Second, it is not obvious that 
"binding" represents the only solution to the German question. French 
opponents to EMU have argued during the referendum campaign in 1992 that 
supranational institutions and a single currency cannot really contain German 
power and the country's potential hegemony over the continent. They claimed 
and continue to insist that Bonn and Berlin will continue to dominate Europe - 
this time via the convergence criteria, the "stability pact" and the independent 
European Central Bank (ECB) modeled after the Bundesbank. In other words, 
containing German power could be achieved by traditional balance of power 
politics, while EMU as an instrument of "binding” only holds if one also 
believes in the effectiveness of international institutions.
Third and most important, if EMU represents a binding strategy of the lesser 
European states to contain German power, why has Germany agreed to it and 
why is it that the German government under Chancellor Kohl remains an 
enthusiastic supporter of a single currency? Some have argued that EMU was 
the price the Bonn government had to pay for acquiescence in German 
unification by his European partners, above all France (Grieco, 1995, 36; 
Sandholtz, 1993, 131-132). This argument is factually wrong. (West) Germany 
had been in favor of a single currency long before unification, provided that 
economic convergence would take place prior to its introduction and that a 
European Central Bank would be as independent as the Bundesbank. The only 
two German concessions to France and the EU as a quid-pro-quo for EU 
support for unification concerned the treaty on political union and an 
accelerated timetable for the ratification of EMU (Cameron, 1995, 60).
This is not to argue that the German political elites do not agree to "self-bind­
ing." The_"taming of German power" (Katzenstein, 1997) through European 
integration has had the enthusiastic support of German elites from the center- 
right to the center-left - long before unification. As we will argue below, 
German acceptance' of "self-binding" results from a collective construction of 
historical memory, a shared perception of Germany's place in Europe, and, last 
not least, visions of European order. Geopolitical arguments must be placed in 
the context of identity-related discourses. The same holds true for France.




























































































Institutional Path Dependence and the Fear of Capital Markets
There remains a powerful explanation for the puzzle that EMU appears to be 
firmly locked in. One could apply the arguments by historical institutionalists 
on "path dependence" in order to account for the puzzle (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
North, 1990; Pierson, 1996; Pierson, 1997; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 
1992). A path-dependent process is one in which positive feedback loops lead 
to increasing returns. An institutional decision in a certain direction made at a 
"critical juncture" offering several possible choices subsequently changes the 
parameters in such a way that the next decision is likely to move in the same 
direction etc. Path dependent processes continue irrespective of the rationality 
of the initial decision and explain why actors often "stick to their guns" even 
though their instrumental interests might have changed. Institutional decisions 
over time greatly increase the costs of adopting alternative policies which were 
initially possible and reduce exit options from a once-chosen path.
It could then be argued that the Maastricht treaties set in motion a process 
which makes the implementation of EMU more likely over time, since the costs 
of changing course are increasingly prohibitive. The political costs would 
involve re-negotiation of the Maastricht treaties, while the economic costs of 
changing course relate both to the enormous investments of public institutions 
in implementing the treaty provisions and of the private sector (banks and 
industry) in setting up new infra-structures. Note the "pull" factor of EMU 
among the EU's Southern member states who were once considered unlikely to 
be able to meet the criteria. In this particular case, the path dependence 
argument is reinforced by the fact that policy-makers fear the reaction of the 
global financial markets, if they change course. The 1992-93 EMS crisis might 
then have had the ironic effect of reinforcing the decision for EMU by 
convincing policy-makers that they have to avoid tampering with the Euro in 
order to stabilize volatile capital markets. The more they reassure the markets 
that the Euro will come in a timely fashion, however, the more they create a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.
The institutionalist account offers indeed a more convincing explanation for the 
puzzle than focussing on economic or geopolitical interests. But it complements 
rather than substitutes the explanation presented below. First, the argument 
about path dependence only makes sense in the context of our discussion, if it 
focusses on the level of national decisions. France and Germany have been on 
the EMU path all along, while Great Britain - at the critical juncture of the 





























































































Second, regarding the reaction of financial markets, this is a case of adaptive 
expectations with economics following politics, not the other way round. The 
issue is certainty and stability, not the nature of a particular decision. National 
and supranational decision-makers decided that they should stick to EMU and 
the timetable outlined in the Maastricht treaties come what may and conveyed 
this decision to the financial markets. The credibility of commitments was at 
stake, not the substantive content of these commitments. In other words, we are 
back to politics.
Third, historical institutionalist arguments about path dependence emphasize 
learning effects. Learning in this case involves the gradual adaptation and 
internalization of new norms and rules, i.e. a socialization process. 
Implementation of EMU then reinforces these norms, insures that they become 
part of collective beliefs of actors, and modifies the standard operating 
procedures of existing public and private institutions. As a result, these norms 
are being taken for granted. Norms, however, are closely related to collective 
identities, since they can be regarded as standards of appropriate behavior 
enacting given identities (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996; Kowert and 
Legro, 1996). This should be all the more the case with regard to the Euro, since 
- as argued above - a common currency has been linked historically to processes 
of state- and nation-building.
Fourth, if the internalization and institutionalization of norms and processes of 
identity formation are closely interlinked, the question still remains where new 
norms and rules such as implied by the introduction of a single European 
currency come from and how they relate to given collective identities. In this 
regard, the 1992/93 EMS crisis is instructive and challenges arguments 
focussing solely on path dependence. One could argue that the EMS crisis 
represented another "critical juncture" at which decision-makers should have re­
evaluated their previous choices. How is it to be explained that the crisis 
reinforced rather than challenged existing elite attitudes about the viability of a 
single currency? While the British Prime Minister John Major took the EMS 
crisis as the ultimate proof that EMU was a risky proposition, both Chancellor 
Kohl and President Mitterrand concluded that it made a single currency even 
more imperative in order to avoid future crises (Cameron, 1993).
These considerations suggest that we need to take a closer look at the process of 
preference formation among political elites in the three countries. Endogenizing 
the preferences and interests of political actors inevitably leads to an analysis of 
the visions about political and economic order attached to EMU and to the con­




























































































the three countries. However, we need to clarify the concept of "national 
identity" before we can present the empirical evidence.
3. What Is "National Identity" and What Can It Explain?
Social psychology - in particular Social Identity and Self-Categorization 
Theories (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Mercer, 1995; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 
1994; Turner, 1987; Weller, 1997; Wendt, forthcoming) - provides a good 
starting point for clarifying the concept of "collective identity." Social identities 
contain, first, ideas describing and categorizing an individual's membership in a 
social group including emotional and evaluative components. Identities provide 
"a system of orientation for self-reference, creating and defining the individual's 
place in society" (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994, 81). In other words, groups 
of individuals perceive that they have something in common on the basis of 
which they form an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1983). Collective 
identity constructions concerning Europe, for example, typically refer to a 
common historical heritage dating back to ancient Greece, to Christianity as a 
shared religious experience, or to a community of liberal democracies and social 
market economies in the sense of a Kantian "pacific federation."
Second, this commonness is accentuated by a sense of difference with regard to 
other communities. Individuals frequently tend to view the group with which 
they identify in a more positive way than the "out-group." Self-categorization 
theory adds the principle of meta-contrast: The greater the perceived differences 
between groups in contrast to the differences within one's own group, the 
greater a group's collective identity. 7 This does not mean, however, that the 
perceived differences between the "in-group" and the "out-group" are 
necessarily based on value judgments and that the "other" is usually looked 
down at (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995). The process of self- and other- 
categorization leads to depersonalization in the sense that social properties are 
no longer ascribed to individuals, but to collectivities. Depersonalization is, 
therefore, a crucial step in the process of social identity creation. Europe's 
"others", for example, are frequently constructed as territorially defined entities 
(America; Russia; Turkey; Asia), but also as the continent's own past of wars 
and nationalist rivalries.
7 While some collective identities, f.e., ethnic identities are based on primordial characteris­
tics, they are nevertheless social constructions which came about through the social practices 
of actors identifying "in-groups" and "out-groups." One should refrain from "objectifying" the 
concept of national identity. Our approach is, therefore, different from (Smith, 1991). For a 
critique of such primordial concepts of national identity see (Lepsius, 1990b). On the 




























































































Third, national identities are social identities defining social groups on the basis 
of mostly territorial criteria. In modem times, they construct the "imagined com­
munities" of nation states and are, therefore, closely linked to ideas about 
sovereignty and statehood (Bloom, 1990). As a result/national identities often 
contain visions of just political and social orders. In the case of identity con­
structions related to Europe, federalist visions of a "United States of Europe," of 
an intergovernmental confederation of nation-states, or ideas about functional 
market integration are examples for such concepts of political order.
Having clarified the concept of national identity, we need to deal with two 
further theoretical issues:
1. How stable are national identities? When do they change?
2. What is the relationship between identities, interests, and behavior?
As to the first question, there is general agreement in the literature that indi­
viduals hold multiple social identities and that these social identities are 
context-bound (Cederman, 1997; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994, 100). A 
group of Europeans might perceive themselves as fellow Europeans when 
dealing with Americans, while emphasizing national differences when 
interacting mainly with each other. Moreover, only some national identity 
constructions are consensual, while others are frequently contested. The 
multiplicity, context-boundedness, and contestedness of collective identities has 
led many authors to conclude that social identities are fluid and subject to 
frequent changes (Neumann, 1996). But the latter does not follow from the 
former. Rather, we know from cognitive psychology that cognitive schemas 
only change rarely and rather slowly. Self-categorization theory also argues that 
self/other categorizations change the more gradually, the more they are 
incorporated in institutions, myths and symbols, as well as cultural 
understandings (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Jervis, 1976; Lebow and Stein, 1993; 
Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Stein, 1995). This should be particularly rele­
vant for national collective identities which usually take quite some time and 
effort to construct and are then embedded in institutions and a country's 
political culture. We assume, therefore, that national collective identities are 
usually rather sticky and only gradually subject to change.
As to the incremental Europeanization of collective national identities, this 
paper explores the following proposition which draws on cultural sociology and 
sociological institutionalism (Haferkamp, 1990; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 




























































































Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 
1992; Swidler, 1986):
Political visions and identity constructions about "Europe" and European order 
impact upon and are incorporated in collective national identities, the more 
they resonate
• with national political cultures and the repertoires o f action embedded in 
them;
• with national political institutions and the ideas about political order 
embedded in them.
We expect different interpretations with regard to what is understood as 
"European" in the various national contexts and how Europe's "others" are 
defined. We also assume finding variation among the nation-states as a result of 
different political institutions and political cultures. Political institutions and 
cultures as intervening variables between ideas about Europe and national 
collective identities perform two tasks:
1. They embed and incorporate specific understandings of national identities 
which makes them resistant against change.
2. The rules of the political institutions also empower or constrain actors in their 
efforts to contest or change identity constructions by distributing both 
ideational and material resources. Not every political actor has an equal 
chance to challenge the prevailing national identities.8
But there are also instances of acute identity crises leading to rapid and 
thorough reconstructions of collective identities. In accordance with cognitive 
psychology, such instances should occur at "critical junctures" when the amount 
of perceived information which severely contradicts given identity 
constructions becomes unbearable. It then depends on the learning capacities of 
individuals, groups, and organizations whether they are able to reconstruct and 
change their collective identities (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1995, 236-238; Tetlock, 
1991). In the following, we discuss such a severe identity crisis in the French 
case. But even in this case did the new identity constructions and the 
Europeanization of French identity built upon and resonate with previous 
nationally defined identities and visions of political order.




























































































The second issue to be tackled concerns the relationship between identity, 
interests, and behavior. First, we do not assume that such broad constructs as 
national identities directly determine political behavior and political decisions. 
Individuals including political decision-makers have a range of choices how to 
enact given collective identities. This paper does not attempt to explain 
particular EU decisions regarding EMU as a direct result of collective identities. 
Rather, our dependent variables are the different general attitudes and 
preferences toward the Euro. We want to explore whether a focus on social 
identities increases our explanatory mileage with regard to these preferences.
Second, ours is not an "identity versus interest" account which would only serve 
to reify both. Political elites legitimately pursue instrumentally defined 
interests; they want to remain and gain political power, for example. The more 
significant question is how identities and instrumental interests interact with 
each other. We argue in this paper that causality may run both ways. A change 
in instrumentally defined and/or materially based interests might well lead over 
time to identity changes. Three cases need to be distinguished:
1. A change in materially defined or instrumental interests might incrementally 
alter elite identities, the more the new interests stabilize over time.
2. Elites might consciously relate their new interests to given social identities in 
order to justify and legitimize the former.
3. Elites might consciously try to create new social identities for the same pur­
pose of legitimizing the change in their material and instrumental interests.
In each case, the causal arrows run from interests to identities, albeit through 
different mechanisms. We argue in this paper, for example, that the 
Europeanization of French identity was interest-driven to begin with, that it 
used the third causal pathway, but that it ultimately affected the elite identities 
themselves.
At the same time, however, collective social identities define in the first place 
how actors view their instrumental interests and which preferences are regarded 
as legitimate and appropriate for enacting given identities. We claim this to be 
the case with regard to the German and British elite discourses on EMU. 
Moreover, we assume that instrumentally defined interests might change more 
frequently than collective identities which are expected to be rather sticky for 
reasons outlined above. In the French case, for example, the newly defined and 




























































































changes in government and, thus, in the instrumental interests of various 
political parties.
In the following, we present empirical evidence from the party debates on EMU 
in Britain, France, and Germany in order to show that these controversies must 
be understood as debates about political order in Europe and as contestations of 
national and/or European identities.
4. The Euro versus National Currencies: Identity Constructions in Brit­
ain, France, and Germany
Great Britain: The Euro versus Englishness
The British attitude toward the single currency has essentially remained the 
same over the last decade or so. At the Maastricht summit, the British 
government reserved the right to decide for itself whether or not the United 
Kingdom would join EMU in 1999 ("opt-out"). The new Labour government 
confirmed this position and made it clear that Britain would probably not 
participate in the first round of EMU, but would adopt a "wait and see" attitude.'1 
The British reluctance toward the single currency reflects long-standing 
divisions within the political elites of both major parties as to the long-term 
goals of European integration. These divisions in general and the British Euro­
skepticism in particular are grounded in particular collective understandings of 
Englishness and English identity.9 10
British views on European integration essentially range from those opposing 
further Europeanization (right wing of the Conservatives, Labour’s far left and 
far right) to a mainstream group within both main parties supporting a ‘Europe 
of the nations’. European federalists remain a minority in the political discourse, 
both among the Tories and within Labour." Even the "Euro-skeptics" who have 
recently taken over the Conservative leadership after John Major's devastating
9 See "Cook rules out early EMU entry for Britain," Electronic Telegraph, 9 June 1997; 
"Amsterdam summit: Britain helps keep EMU on track," Financial Times, 17 June 1997.
10 The national discourse in Great Britain still identifies "Britishness" with "Englishness." 
There are, of course, sub-national identity-related discourses in Scotland and Wales with 
strong anti-English sentiments. It would be interesting to see whether these discourses have 
incorporated references to a collective European identity in order to distance themselves from 
"London." This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
" In contrast, the majority o f the Liberal Democratic Party favors further European integration 




























































































defeat in the general elections, remain divided among themselves in both major 
parties (Spicer, 1992): Some want to leave the EU altogether, while others 
favour a mere free trade area. But the mainstream of the two leading parties 
share a consensual vision of European order. Labour's manifesto for the 1997 
elections argued that “our vision of Europe is of an alliance of independent 
nations choosing to co-operate to achieve the goals they cannot achieve alone. 
We oppose a European federal superstate.“ The Conservative manifesto claimed 
in very similar terms that “the government has a positive vision for the 
European Union as a partnership of nations. We want to be in Europe but not 
run by Europe. (...) Some others would like to build a federal Europe. A British 
Conservative Government will not allow Britain to be part of a Federal 
European State.“'2
This consensus regarding an intergovernmental Europe of nation-states is 
reflected in the attitudes toward EMU in both parties. The official positions of 
both Labour and the Conservatives advocate a British "wait and see" policy 
concerning the single currency, and both parties committed themselves to a 
popular referendum before Britain would join EMU. If such a referendum were 
held today, the British public would reject the single currency by wide margins 
(56% against and only 26% in favor according to a May 1997 poll).12 3 As a 
result, it is not surprising that Tony Blair, the new Prime Minister, has 
continued on the British "opt-out” path as his predecessor did.
British policies toward the EU reflect collectively held beliefs about English 
identity. More than twenty years after entry into the European Community, the 
majority of the British political elite still regards Britain as ‘of rather than in’ 
Europe; it remains the ‘awkward partner’ and ‘semi-detached’ from Europe 
(Bailey, 1983; George, 1990; George, 1992). There is still a feeling of ‘them’ 
vs. ‘us’ between Britain and the continent. For Jenkins, the semi-detachment 
from Europe is a result of the weakness of British politics wishing to play in 
another world league after the world wars, an ‘illusion of grandeur’ in the words 
of Stephen George (George, 1990, 14; Jenkins, 1994). In the British political 
discourse then, ‘Europe’ is still identified with the continent and perceived as 
‘the other’ in contrast to Englishness. In the following quote from Robin Cook, 
the new British Foreign Secretary, Britain is located outside 'Europe:' "... 
because one of the things that those of us who have gone to Europe have learnt 
is that there is also a change of opinion in Europe. As it happens, when I first
12 See Labour manifesto ‘Britain will be better with new Labour’. Http://www. labour- 
win97.org.uk/manifesto/index/html; Conservative manifesto ‘Our vision for Britain’. Http:// 
w w w .conservative-party.org.uk/manifesto/defe3.html.




























































































went to Europe, the first European politician I met was Lionel Jospin."14 It is 
therefore not surprising, that parts of the English national identity are often 
viewed as potentially threatened by European integration. Using the principle of 
meta-contrast (see above), one could then argue that the collective identification 
with national symbols, national history, and national institutions is far greater in 
the British political discourse than a potential identification with European 
symbols, history, and institutions. Europe is more often than not considered as 
part of "them" rather than "us," and this view is shared by both major parties.
The social construction of "Englishness" as the core of British national identity 
comprises the meanings attached to institutions, historical memory, and 
symbols. Each of these components are hard to reconcile with a vision of 
European political order which goes beyond intergovemmentalism (Lynch, 
1997; Lyon, 1991; Mitchell, 1992; Schauer, 1996; Schauer, 1997; Schmitz and 
Geserick, 1996). British institutions like the Parliament and the Crown form 
important elements of national identity. The identity-related meanings attached 
to these institutions center around a peculiar understanding of national 
sovereignty. The Crown symbolizes "external sovereignty" in terms of 
independence from Rome and the Pope as well as from the European continent 
since 1066. Parliamentary or "internal" sovereignty represents a most important 
constitutional principle relating to a 700 year old parliamentary tradition and 
hard-fought victories over the King. English sovereignty is, thus, directly linked 
to myths about a continuous history of liberal and democratic evolution and 
"free-born Englishmen." It is not surprising, therefore, that British objections 
against transferring sovereignty to European supranational institutions are 
usually justified on grounds of lacking democratic - meaning parliamentary - 
accountability. That this argument has more to do with collective national 
identity than with concerns about democracy in Europe becomes obvious when 
the same British leaders routinely object to strengthening the powers of the 
European Parliament.
Another identity construction which is relevant in our context relates to the 
British history as a world and naval power (Wallace, 1991). The glorious days 
of the British empire are long gone, but are being preserved in national myths 
about colonial history and the special relationship with the U.S. based on a 
shared perception of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism. As a result, references to the 
importance of the Commonwealth and to the Anglo-American special
14 Speech in the House of Commons, June 9, 1997, column 801, http//:www.parliament.the- 
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ cml99798/cmhansrd/cm970609/deblext/70609-08.htm. The rest of 
this speech congratulates new Labour of having won new friends in 'Europe.' But the wording 




























































































relationship are often used to justify objections against further European 
integration. Moreover, the British past as a global world power also serves to 
substantiate a global view of international relations and an "outward looking" 
attitude - as opposed to the "inward looking" continental Europeans, of course.
One of the most powerful symbols of Britain's great past as a world power is the 
pound Sterling, the former world reserve currency. While the German Deutsche 
Mark stands for German post-World War II prosperity (see below), the British 
pound serves as a strong reminder of a glorious past. This symbolism is directly 
related to notions of sovereignty and English exceptionalism distinguishing 
Britain from the European continent. It is hard to see how the pound Sterling as 
a symbol of collective national identity might be given up in favor of a single 
currency with the strange name of "Euro." During the EMS crisis of 1993, the 
British government would rather leave the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
altogether than accepting the humiliation of devaluating the pound against the 
other currencies through a re-adjustment of the currency parities (Cameron, 
1993).The ensuing market-driven devaluation of the pound was seen as a 
humiliation by many Conservatives which then became even more Euro-skeptic 
(Young, 1997).
These Euro-skeptics routinely use references to identity-related terms such as 
sovereignty to justify their rejection of EMU (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, 
1993; Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, 1994; Young, 1997).15 They (correctly) 
identify the single currency as a huge step toward political integration. As they 
object to a European union based on strong supranational institutions, this is 
precisely why they reject the Euro. As John Redwood, one of the leading 
Conservative Euro-skeptics, once put it, "abolish the pound and you abolish 
Britain. You make a decisive move towards a country called Europe governed 
from Brussels and Frankfurt.... reading the treaties and looking at the wide 
range of institutions already established in the name of the European Union 
shows that the intention is the establishment of a new country" (Redwood, 
1997, 19).
Faced with such identity-based opposition, former Prime Minister John Major 
tried to preserve party unity by insisting on the British "opt-outs" during the 
Maastricht treaty negotiations and adopting a "wait and see" attitude afterwards. 
He frequently used interest-related rather than identity-based arguments to 
justify his course of action;





























































































Britain will not join a single currency in 1996 or 1997 and, frankly, 1 increasingly 
doubt whether anybody will be ready to do so. ... Quite apart from the other arguments, 
the economic conditions are absolutely crucial to the success o f a single currency.16
The divisions among the Tories - not the least about Europe - cost John Major 
his job. But new Labour has its own problems with national identity 
constructions. To begin with, it was not before 1987 that the British Labour 
Party changed its anti-European course, after it had suffered a catastrophic 
defeat in the 1983 elections (Haahr, 1992; Haahr, 1993; Tindale, 1992). 
Labour’s U-turn over Europe in 1987 was partly conducted in the hope of 
outflanking Thatcherism on the national level utilizing the EC social policy. In 
the elections to the European Parliament 1989, Labour then presented itself as 
the European party in Britain. While Labour was edging toward a more positive 
approach to European integration, there remained quite a few Euro-skeptics in 
the party. The divisions within Labour on the EMU remained rather stable and 
became apparent again in the 1997 election campaign. While now Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook ruled out British participation in the single currency in 
1999, Gordon Brown, the new Chancellor of the Exchequers, sounded more 
positive. The interest-based language of those who want to keep the British 
options open, did not change with the shift in government:
At present, we do not know whether there will be a single currency to join in 1999.(.„) 
What is valuable about that debate, and what Britain can usefully help to further, is the 
gathering consensus that the prime objectives of economic policy should be growth, 
employment and competitiveness, and that the single currency must be judged on 
whether it will help or hinder those objectives.17
In sum, the British debate on EMU and the continuing reluctance toward joining 
the single currency cannot be adequately understood without reference to 
constructions of national identity. British supporters of a ‘wait and see’ policy 
use economic interest-based arguments to justify their attitudes toward a single 
currency, while the opponents of EMU use identity arguments to make their 
point. They fear that Britain will lose the ability to govern herself and argue 
against any further loss of national sovereignty. While the British business
16 Speech in the House of Commons, March 1, 1995, http://www.fco.gov.uk/
europe/debate_0!0395.txt. Major used similar lines throughout the years and is now advocat­
ing delaying the decision. See his interview with the Daily Telegraph, June 3, 1997; Speech in 
House of Commons, June 9, 1997, column 817/8IS, http://www.parliament.the-stationary- 
office.co.uk/pa/cmI99798/cmhansrd/cm970609/debtext/70609-08.htm.






























































































community appears far more open-minded about joining EMU early on.1' 
supporters of the Euro among the political elites need to frame their attitude in 
terms of keeping the British options open. The political discourse centers 
around whether to join later or never. This is in sharp contrast to the debates in 
France and Germany which focus on joining now or later. While a "wait and 
see" attitude is the trademark of British Euro supporters, Euro opponents need 
to use such arguments on the continent.
The institutional setting of the British parliamentary system together with the 
election results also tend to weaken rather than strengthen Euro supporters who 
do not constitute a majority in either of the two big parties. This was 
particularly significant when John Major held a very slim majority in the House 
of Commons. He was held hostage by an equally small, but very outspoken 
minority of Euro-skeptics who used identity-related arguments to make their 
case. This situation changed, of course, with Tony Blair's landslide victory at 
the polls. But the institutional setting of British "adversarial politics" still 
prevents a coalition among Euro-supporters across party lines. This situation is 
different on the continent.
France: The Euro and the Reconstruction of National Identity
Twenty years ago, a single European currency based on a convergence of 
economic (austerity) policies would have been hard to swallow for the French 
political elite. First, it would not have resonated with the general orientation of 
French monetary and economic policies. Monetary policy in the Fifth Republic 
until the early 1980s was to serve broader economic goals defined by the 
government which also controlled the decisions of the French central bank. 
French economic policy used to be based on a specific version of Keynesianism 
with a heavy dose of state interventionism in the economy dating back to the 
"trente glorieuses" (Fourastie, 1985). As a result, France favored the 
“monetarist approach*1 to monetary union over Germany’s “economist 
approach** since the days of the Werner plan.
Second, the French political elite also used to share a specific vision of 
European political order, "l'Europe des nations” (the Europe of nation-states), as 
the founding father of the Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle, used to 
call it. Again, a single currency and the ensuing transfer of monetary authority 
to supranational institutions is incompatible with such an intergovemmentalist 
vision of the future European order. 18





























































































Why is it then that EMU which largely followed the German model-in terms of 
the independence of the ECB and the convergence criteria, was by and large 
accepted by the main parties in France, by Socialists, Liberals, and Gaullists and 
irrespective of whether either of them was in government or opposition?/We 
argue in the following that the French approach toward EMU went hand in hand 
with a re-orientation of French economic and monetary policies as well as a 
change in French approaches to European order. Most significant, these changes 
led to a re-construction and Europeanization of French national identity which 
were exacerbated and accelerated by the end of the Cold War (see also Flynn, 
1996; Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt, 1997). The re-construction of French identity 
started in the 1980s and was originally motivated largely by economic and 
political interests. However, it assumed its own dynamics over time and now 
explains to a large degree why the Paris governments continue to support the 
single currency based on the German model - despite enormous unemployment 
and despite grumblings on either side of the political spectrum.
The most important change in French attitudes toward both economic policies 
and European political order with important repercussions for the EMU project 
occurred on the French left in the aftermath of Mitterrand's economic turn­
around in the early 1980s. When President François Mitterrand and the Socialist 
Party (PS) came into power in 1981, they initially embarked upon a project of 
creating democratic socialism in France based on some sort of leftist Keynesi­
anism. This project bitterly failed when the adverse reactions of the capital mar­
kets hit the French economy which in turn led to a severe loss of support for 
Mitterrand's policies by the electorate. In 1983, Mitterrand had practically no 
choice other than changing course dramatically, if he wanted to remain in power 
(Bauchard, 1986; Uterwedde, 1988). This political change led to a deep crisis 
within the Socialist Party which gradually abandoned its Socialist project and 
moved toward ideas once derisively labeled "Social Democratic." In changing 
course, the party followed its leader and President, François Mitterrand, who 
had defined the construction of the European Community as a central issue of 
his time in office.
The re-orientation of the French Socialists toward neoliberal economics - in 
"French colors", of course - went hand in hand with a change in attitudes toward 
European integration as a whole which had hitherto often been denounced as a 
"Capitalist" project. The Socialists now saw the European future in a more or 
less federal model (called “federation of nation-states"). They were willing to 
share larger amounts of sovereignty in various domains, for example security, 
economic and social policies, because national sovereignty in its traditional 




























































































result, the commitment to European integration had reached consensual status in 
the PS by the mid-1980s.
The PS's move toward Europe went hand in hand with a deliberate effort to 
reconstruct French national identity in European colors. The French Socialists 
started highlighting the common European historical and cultural heritage. They 
increasingly argued that the French future was to be found in Europe. As 
Mitterrand once put it, "France is our fatherland, Europe is our future!"'9 The 
French left also started embracing the notion of a "European France", extending 
the vision of the French "mission civilisatrice" toward Europe writ large. The 
peculiar historical and cultural legacies of France can be transferred from the 
“first Nation-state*1 in Europe to the continent as a whole, because all European 
states are children of enlightenment, democracy and republicanism. France 
imprints its marks on Europe. This identity constmction uses traditional under­
standings of Frenchness and the French nation-state - sovereignty understood as 
enlightenment and republicanism, the French mission civilisatrice - and 
"Europeanize" them. In contrast to English identity constructions where 
"Europe" is still the "other," this understanding incorporates Europe into one's 
own nationally defined identity and the understandings about sovereignty and 
political order embedded in it. As a result, French identity is transformed and 
Europeanized, but only to the degree that ideas about Europe can be 
incorporated into and resonate with previous visions of the state.
Europe, in turn, has to defend its identity in a globalized world and, at the same 
time, has to play a specific role in the world. In the view of the French 
Europeanized Socialists then, the "other" of European identity is constituted by 
the U.S. and Japan. The Euro, for example, should create a European answer 
against the Dollar and the Yen, defending the European economy against the 
outside world. This argument was put forward especially by the Socialists as 
early as 1988 (Mitterrand, 1988, 14; PS, 1988, 78).
The change in the French Socialists' visions about European political order and 
their attempts to Europeanize the French national identity is reflected in their 
attitudes toward EMU. Again, President Mitterrand set the trend and was 
followed by his party. However, while support for a single currency as a 
political project in conjunction with the larger issue of European integration 
was locked in early on and has remained so ever since, the French Socialists' 
understanding of its economic foundations included remnants of French state 
interventionism. The original French proposal for EMU, for example, was a far 
cry from the version adopted in the Maastricht treaty following the German 19




























































































model. The PS nevertheless interpreted the Maastricht treaty and EMU in such a 
way that monetary policy was to be co-decided by the ECB and the Council of 
Ministers and that the ECB had to realize the community goals of economic 
growth and employment.2/  It is noteworthy that this position has essentially 
remained stable since the mid-1980s; it survived the change in government from 
Mitterrand to Chirac and back to the Chirac-Jospin cohabitation. It also 
explains the French insistence for greater coordination of the economic policies 
by the member states.
However, whenever the PS had to choose between its support for European 
integration and its preferences on economic policies, Europe carried the day. 
This explains the party's stubborn support for EMU during the referendum's 
campaign, during opposition from 1995 to 1997, and when it came back into 
government in 1997 as well. While EMU looked rather different from the 
Socialists' ideas about European economic order, they continuously supported it 
as part and parcel of their political vision of Europe. We argue that this political 
vision of Europe was in turn incorporated in their reconstructed collective 
identity as a European Social Democratic party.
Similar changes in the prevailing visions of European order combined with 
reconstructions of French national identity took place on the French right.20 1 The 
heir of Charles de Gaulle's vision of 'l'Europe des patries', the Rassemblement 
pour la République (RPR), provides another example of the French political 
elite changing course. As regards economic and monetary policies, the RPR had 
traditionally supported state-interventionism (planification) combined with 
Keynesian aspirations. Under the influence of both Thatcherism and 
Reagonomics, it turned around to monetarism (Baudouin, 1990). The Gaullists 
in general still subscribe to a model of “Europe of the Nations". National 
sovereignty is regarded as the core and inalienable constitutive of the Nation­
state, which itself is the only legitimized model of social order. The party elite is 
divided about whether to interpret this in a narrow and “orthodox" way, 
excluding any transfer of sovereignty, or to adopt a “modem" and more open 
interpretation, allowing transfers to a certain extent.
20 See Le poing et la rose, No. 119, April 1987, p. 10; Nouvelles Internationales, No. 56, 19 
December 1991; Elisabeth Guigou, Vendredi, No. 131, 7 February 1992; (PS, 1991, 57; PS, 
1992a, Sheet No. 5; PS, 1992b, 11).
21 We ignore the French center parties, the Liberal Democrats (Union pour la Démocratie 
Française), here since they have continuously been the most pro-European French parties em­




























































































Understandings of what constitutes sovereignty and how much supranational- 
ism is compatible with it, however, concern key features of national identity, 
Frenchness in this case. It is not surprising, therefore, that competing visions 
about European order held by RPR policy-makers correspond to differing views 
of Frenchness and French identity. President Jacques Chirac and former Prime 
Minister Alain Juppé tend to express similar ideas about the Europeanization of 
French distinctiveness as their counterparts among the French left:
The European Community is also a question of identity. If we want to preserve our 
values, our way of life, our standard of living, our capacity to count in the world, to 
defend our interests, to remain carriers of a humanistic message, we are certainly bound 
to build a united and solid bloc... If France says yes (to the treaty of Maastricht/TR), she 
can better reaffirm in what I believe: French exceptionalism.”
They also highlight the European heritage including economic achievements, 
such as a "European social model" in contrast to U.S. laissez-faire capitalism.2 3
In contrast, French "Euro-skeptics" such as Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin 
stick to traditional understandings of sovereignty and a purely national view of 
collective identity. They still share "a certain idea of France" resulting from of 
its history, drawing their sources from Gaullism and/or the Great Revolution. 
They stick to the notion of a "Europe des patries" rejecting supranationalism as 
the demise of the French model of culture and civilization. They fear that 
national peculiarities perish and become homogenized in a European (as well as 
global) melting-pot. In this understanding, the definition of “us“ remains 
national, while the “other" is still everybody non-French.
These competing visions of French identity are expressed in attitudes toward 
the Euro. While the RPR gradually adopted the neoliberal discourse, the party 
remains divided over EMU. Again, these divisions had nothing to do with 
differences over economics, but with the split about what European integration 
meant. The cleavage became first apparent during the controversy over the 
Gaullist "Manifeste pour l'Union des Etats de l ’Europe" in 1990. A draft by 
then party leader Jacques Chirac and Alain Juppé accepted the transfer of 
sovereignty to supranational institutions, but reserved the right of invoking 
overwhelming national interests and demanded to strengthen the European 
Council. EMU should result from a progressive unification of economic 
conditions leading to a common currency. The concurrent draft by Charles 
Pasqua and Philippe Séguin ( “Changer de cap") argued that European
22 Jacques Chirac, in Liberation, Sept. 11, 1992.




























































































integration had lost a good part of its raison d 'être with the end of the Cold War 
and that it was time to reflect anew on de Gaulle’s vision for Europe. Pasqua 
and Séguin were motivated by the fear of Germany and a resentment against the 
bureaucracy in Brussels. Pasqua and Séguin then expressed their opposition to a 
single currency, based primarily on political rather than economic grounds 
(Joas, 1996, 227-229). While the RPR as a whole adopted a position closer to 
the Chirac/Juppé line, the divisions remained and became apparent again during 
the referendum's debate in 1992. Pasqua and Séguin led the battle against EMU, 
while Chirac and Juppé remained largely silent. When Jacques Chirac became 
President in 1995, however, he committed himself to the single currency. The 
internal divisions were papered over. They, once again, became apparent when 
the French right lost its majority in the Assemblée Nationale in 1997.
In sum then, support for and opposition against EMU in the French debate 
center around competing understandings of national sovereignty and of 
"Frenchness." While the majority of the French political elite in both the PSF 
and the RPR has gradually come to embrace a Europeanization of French 
distinctiveness and to identify the future of France as a nation-state with 
European order, a distinct minority sticks to the old Gaullist concepts of French 
"grandeur" and "indépendance". Attitudes toward EMU reflect these identity 
constructions.
Of the three countries considered in this paper, France is the only one in which 
a major reshaping and reshuffling of the elite discourse on national identity took 
place in recent years. Two "critical junctures" leading to a widespread 
perception of crisis triggered these reconstructions of national identity. First, the 
failure of the Socialist program in the early 1980s and the turnaround of 
Mitterrand's economic policies served as a catalyst for an identity crisis among 
the French left as a result of which the Parti Socialiste became a modem 
European Social Democratic Party and embraced European integration as well 
as the Euro. There is no doubt that this identity change was initially caused by 
the desire to remain in power. Thus, political interests led to a thorough 
alteration of preferences about European order and, subsequently, to identity 
changes. We do not dispute that interests changed identities in this case. But the 
reconstruction of French identity by the Socialists was profound. It largely 
explains why the PS stuck to its support for EMU and European integration 
even after they lost power in 1995 - in other words, even after their instrumental 
interests changed once again.
Second, one should not overlook that the end of the Cold War constituted 
another "critical juncture" and crisis experience for French identity. When the 




























































































security order was constructed, France - la grande nation - remained largely on 
the sidelines of the action. President Mitterrand even embarrassed himself 
initially by attempting to strike his own private deals with leaders in East Berlin 
and Moscow (Zelikow and Rice, 1995). French diplomatic efforts failed 
miserably. As a result, large parts of the political elite finally realized the grand 
illusion of the myths of "grandeur" and "indépendance." The way out was 
Europe, including the Euro (Flynn, 1995). It should be noted, however, that the 
end of the Cold War to some extent reinforced rather than modified pre-existing 
beliefs about Europe and European order. Those who had already embraced the 
notion of a Europeanized France, used the reshaping of the European security 
environment to confirm their conviction that European integration should move 
ahead quickly. The minority among both the French right and the left, however, 
argued in favor of a return to traditional balance of power politics including a 
strictly nationalist vision of French identity (Chevènement, 1992).
In the French case and in contrast to Britain, the institutional setting of the Fifth 
Republic with its strong presidency and national executive and its rather weak 
parliament favors the Europeanized majority who sees the French future in 
Europe. Both presidents Mitterrand and Chirac deeply identified with a 
European France and particularly Mitterrand was eager to push European 
integration further. They both picked pro-European cabinets; the recent 
cohabitation with Prime Minister Jospin only brought Mitterrand's old foreign 
policy elite back into power. Thus, the institutional settings of the Fifth 
Republic allow French political leaders to shield the executive from "Euro­
skeptics." At the same time, opponents of the Euro are too fragmented and 
spread over both major parties to constitute a serious threat to the elite majority. 
The same holds true for Germany, albeit for slightly different reasons.
Germany: Between the Euro and the Deutsche Mark
German agreement to EMU and the stubbornness with which the majority of the 
political elite supports the Euro seem strange at first, since Germany has more 
to lose from monetary union than any other country (see above). Even more 
surprising is the lack of public controversy about the Euro, until recently, and 
despite the fact that a majority of the German mass public opinion rejects giving 
up the cherished Deutsche Mark. German elite support for the Euro has been 
challenged so far by only few prominent politicians, mostly prime ministers of 
German Lander facing election campaigns. They were joined by the more 
implicit opposition to the Euro voiced by the powerful German Bundesbank,21 24
24 On the Bundesbank position in general see (Cameron, 1995; Goodman, 1992)." See also 




























































































But the critics framed their opposition in terms of insisting on a strict adherence 
to the convergence criteria and a quest for delaying the third stage of EMU. All 
let it be known that they were in favor of European integration.
We argue in the following that the peculiar German debate about the Euro must 
be understood in the framework of identity politics. On the one hand, general 
support for the single currency is based on a powerful part of German post- 
World War II identity - Euro-patriotism - which is supposed to overcome the 
German nationalist and militarist past once and for all. On the other hand, 
opponents of the Euro link their skepticism on another part of German 
collective identity - Deutsche Mark patriotism. The latter explains the rigid 
insistence of German government officials on the strict fulfillment of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria (to make the Euro "as strong as the Deutsche 
Mark"). It also explains why opponents of EMU hammer away at this point, the 
more it appeared as if Germany itself had trouble meeting the criteria.
To understand the German debate (or lack thereof) on EMU, one has to note the 
federalist consensus ("United States of Europe") among the German parties 
ranging from the center-right to the center-left. This consensus has remained 
largely untouched since the late 1950s when the German Social Democrats 
changed their position on European integration. A minority view, particularly in 
the Bavarian CSU favors a more intergovernmental model of Europe. The CSU 
now strives for a confederation of states, in which the nation states keep their 
sovereignty.25
Attitudes toward EMU are based on these larger visions of European political 
integration. The majority of the German political elite in all major parties views 
the Euro as a cornerstone of European political integration, despite a legitimacy 
crisis in German public opinion. Since the Euro is regarded as part and parcel of 
this political project, supporters strongly insist that a delay with regard to 
entering the third stage in 1999 would "endanger the successes of the European
ner," Die Zeit, Sept. 12, 1997. Of course, the Bundesbank's opposition to the Euro is easily 
explained by the fact that it is the single most important loser of power by EMU. As a result, 
we will not deal much further with the Bundesbank's position, since it is hardly surprising. 
One could argue, however, that the Bundesbank's strong position in the German political 
debate is itself a function not only of its institutional power and independence, but also of its 
position in German identity politics as a most significant symbol of Deutsche Afark-patriotism 
(see below).
25 See "Es gab einmal eine europaische Bewegung in Deutschland ... das ist vorbei," Siiddeut- 




























































































integration process up to now," as Chancellor Kohl put it.26 Former Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, a Social Democrat, argued even more bluntly that "any delay 
means in all likelihood the ultimate abandonment of the currency union project; 
(...) As a result, Europe would face the worst crisis of European integration 
since the 1950 Schuman plan."27 Thus, the German political elite identifies the 
Euro with European integration as a whole.
Support for the Euro among the German political elites is not only linked to 
their broader visions about European order, but has directly to do with German 
post-World War II national identity. The identity component in the German 
discourse on the Euro is probably the strongest among the three countries 
investigated here. Two aspects of the concept of "national identity" are 
particularly relevant in the German context - historical memories and the way 
one's own past is understood, on the one hand, and performances and 
achievements which are claimed to serve as a model for others, on the other. We 
deal first with German collective understandings of the country's past and its 
consequences for the debate surrounding the Euro.
In contrast to Britain and France, the German notion of what constitutes the 
"other", the non-European, has much more to do with European and German 
national history. Thus, Germany's nationalist and militarist past constitutes the 
"Other" in the process of "post-national" identity formation whereby 
Europeanness replaces traditional notions of national identity. The new 
Germany should be firmly anchored in "the West" and in Europe, or, as the 
famous writer Thomas Mann put it, "we do not want a German Europe, but a 
European Germany." For decades, European integration was regarded by 
German political elites as a sort of substitute for their own defeated, divided, 
and occupied country. Due to their problematic national identity following the 
Holocaust and World War II, and in contrast to the British or the French, most 
Germans thought the aim of European unity so self-evident that they never 
really debated the pros and cons but only the means. The German political elite 
considered the establishment of a lasting European peace order as the ultimate 
goal of integration, "Europe" thus being tantamount to superseding nationalism. 
The federal government under Chancellor Kohl as well as the SPD opposition 
are firmly determined to render the European unification process irreversible 
because they are convinced that the concept of a unified Europe is the most
26 Quoted from "Huber halt Euro-Start ohne Paris fiir moglich,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 7, 
1997.
27 "Helmut Schmidt iiber die sechs Griinde, aus denen der Euro nicht scheitern darf - schon gar 




























































































effective assurance against the renaissance of nationalism, a relapse into power- 
political rivalries, and disastrous conflicts.
Since the 1950s, a fundamental consensus has emerged among the political 
elites and is generally shared by public opinion that European integration is in 
Germany's vital interest what Simon Bulmer called the "Europeanization" of 
German politics (Bulmer, 1989). See also (Hellmann, 1996; Katzenstein, 1997). 
The multilateralization of German foreign policy was initiated by Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer who regarded the integration of the German state and society 
in the West as the best means of overcoming the German past. West Germany 
viewed itself mainly as a trading state which rarely insisted on its national 
interest due to the shaming memories of extreme nationalism rendering "the 
language of national interest unusable" (Paterson, 1996, 65).
The time period since end of the Cold War, the collapse of East Germany, and 
German unification in 1990 is particularly significant for our argument. With 
the unexpected end of the East-West conflict and regained German sovereignty, 
a broad range of foreign policy opportunities suddenly emerged creating a 
situation in which the Germans could have redefined their national interests. 
Instead, not much happened. Germany did not re-consider its fundamental 
foreign policy orientations, since Germany's commitment to European 
integration had long outlived the context in which it had originally emerged 
(Hellmann, 1996; Katzenstein, 1997; Muller, 1992; Rittberger, 1993).
Even after unification and with more sovereignty to sacrifice for the European 
cause, the majority of the German political elite shares Chancellor Kohl’s belief 
that only deeper political and economic union - symbolized by a single currency 
- can anchor Germany firmly in the West and strengthen European institutions 
to ensure peace in the years ahead. As former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
argued,
If the Euro-currency is not realized by January 1, 1999, it will most likely never again 
be realized; ... This would result in the worst crisis of the European integration process 
- possibly its end! And Germany would be isolated - exactly the opposite of the 
binding which all chancellors from Adenauer to Kohl have pursued as the overarching 
strategic goal, in the vital German interest!28
Chancellor Kohl in particular wants to be remembered as the one who pushed 
through EMU and hence made a closer European Union inevitable, thus 
preventing a return to nationalism in Europe (Banchoff, 1997a; Banchoff,




























































































1997b, 61-63). Kohl framed the the single currency as the symbol of European 
integration and he has deeply identified his political fate with the realization of 
the Euro.29 His pledge to stand for a renewed candidacy in 1998 is motivated 
primarily by his commitment to European integration and the Euro. He also 
labeled 1997 - the year of reference for the fulfillment of the convergence 
criteria - as the "key year of Europe", as existential for further integration. Kohl 
appears to believe that if "the house of Europe” is not built now, it won't be 
possible either ten years later. He even argued that the success of EMU was a 
"question of war and peace."30
It is particularly interesting that the German center-left has largely remained 
silent over EMU and that the majority of the SPD elite still supports it. The 
German left does blame the current record level unemployment on the 
government's austerity measures but few draw the obvious connection between 
those policies and Bonn's determination to meet the convergence criteria. The 
German trade unions in particular refrain from criticizing the Euro, even though 
their constituents appear to be the biggest losers of the austerity policy to reach 
the 3% deficit goal. Despite continuing popular reluctance to give up the 
Deutsche Mark, a fractious debate on the Euro is still not imminent and there 
have been few hints that the front of supporters will collapse.
In essence then, advocates of a single European currency, Chancellor Kohl in 
particular, have managed to frame the issue in the German political discourse by 
constructing an extremely powerful equation linking the Euro to German 
identity:
Support for the Euro = Support for European integration 
= "good Europeanness"
= "good Germanness"
= Rejection o f the German militarist and nationalist past.
This equation forces opponents of a single currency to make sure that they 
cannot be regarded as "bad Germans", i.e., proponents of German nationalism. 
As a result, German opponents of the Euro almost never declare their opposition 
openly, but rather demand a postponement of the Euro. They usually go at great 
length to show that one can be a "good German European" and still remain 
skeptical vis-à-vis a single currency.
29 See The Economist, Oct. 26, 1996, pp. 23-29.
30 In a speech to the German Bundestag, see "Kohl: Bei der europaischen Wahrung ist Stabil- 




























































































At the same time, however, supporters of the Euro need to cope with another as­
pect of German post-World War II identity, "Deutsche Mark patriotism." This is 
the ultimate reason why the Euro is supposed to look very much like the 
Deutsche Mark and why the political discourse in Germany mainly focusses on 
the issue of how strong a currency the Euro will become. It is significant in this 
context that the German government was only willing to give up the previously 
hegemonic role of the Deutsche Mark within the EMS if the future single 
currency was institutionally designed according to German monetary 
institutions. The European Central Bank (ECB) was modeled after Germany's 
Bundesbank (Goodman, 1992; Notermans, 1991; Sturm, 1995). Germany even 
managed to commit its partners to a "stability pact" imposing rigid central 
guidelines and potential fines for offenders to prevent EMU members from 
undermining the Euro by backsliding on economic commitments once they have 
joined up. Finally, the German government succeeded in bringing the European 
Monetary' Institute and later the ECB to Frankfurt, in a further attempt to 
symbolically frame the ECB as the successor of the much cherished 
Bundesbank.
The exaggerated emphasis placed on meeting the convergence criteria up to the 
decimal point has little to do with economic policy as such, but reflects instead 
a particular reading of German pre-World War II history and the collective 
memories of rising inflation and the World economic crisis with its 
consequences for the Nazis coming into power. Again, the "other" in this part of 
the German collective identity is the country's own past. Overcoming the 
German past also meant instituting sound economic policies of low inflation 
and controlled budget deficits so as to never again being tempted to solve 
economic problems by "printing money." The Deutsche Mark became the 
symbolic embodiment of this economic policy. Over the years, the Deutsche 
Mark has acquired a highly identity-inducing value as a powerful national 
symbol which embodies Germany's prosperity and its economic miracle after 
the second World War. The 1948 monetary reform with the introduction of the 
Deutsche Mark and the immediately following change from shortage of goods 
to consumer paradise has become a national myth linked to the particular 
German understandings of a "social market economy" (soziale Marktwirtschaft) 
which contributed much to West Germany's self-confidence (Haselbach, 1994, 
256). The Deutsche Mark now stands for the "rise from the ruins" of World War 
II (Helleiner, 1997).
Deutsche Mark patriotism and German Europeanness then constitute two 
significant aspects of German post-World War II national identity. Giving up 
the Deutsche Mark in favor of the Euro is, thus, in accordance with the latter, 




























































































that German elite supporters of EMU worked hard to insure that the institutional 
setup of the single currency looked extremely similar to the German monetary 
institutions.
To the extent that there is a German debate on the single currency, it is largely 
framed in terms of Euro-patriotism versus Deutsche Mark patriotism. As a 
result, supporters of the Euro emphasize that the single currency will be "as 
strong and stable" as the Deutsche Mark and that there will be virtually no 
difference between the two - except for the name. Critics of EMU, however, try 
to capitalize on Deutsche Mark patriotism suggesting that the Euro will never 
reach the stability of the German currency.
The proxy for this identity-related debate is the controversy surrounding the 
strictness with which the convergence criteria should be applied. Rigid 
adherence to the convergence criteria before and after EMU became the 
symbolic causal mechanism by which the "strong Deutsche Mark" is going to 
be converted into an equally "strong Euro." Of course, this has not much to do 
with the Maastricht treaty allowing for much more flexibility than the German 
debate appears to assume.31
The insistence on the convergence criteria was originally meant to reassure a 
nervous public opinion that the Euro would equal the strength and stability of 
the Deutsche Mark and that, therefore, the savings of ordinary Germans 
remained safe. The more it became clear in 1997, however, that Germany would 
have a hard time meeting the convergence criteria itself due to its sluggish 
economic growth and an extremely high unemployment rate, the more 
opponents of the single currency started using the convergence criteria as a 
proxy to hide their criticism of EMU. 32 They tried to hammer away at popular 
fears that the Euro will not become as strong a currency as the Deutsche Mark. 
The 3 % criterion of the Maastricht treaty stipulating that the budget deficit
31 See particularly article 104c of the European Community Treaty. It stipulates that the overall 
economic and budgetary situation has to be taken into account when judging about a member 
state which does not fulfill the convergence criteria concerning budget deficits in 1997. In 
other words, whether states are ultimately invited to join or not remains a political decision 
rather than one dictated by economic automatism.
32 See the largely symbolic German debate in the Summer of 1997 on whether 3,0 means 
"three, zero" or "three, something." See "Stoiber beharrt auf Kritik an EWU,” Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, June 23, 1997; "Germans Resolve Feud Over Euro," International Herald Tribune, 
July 2, 1997; "Huber halt Euro-Start ohne Paris fur moglich," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, July 7, 
1997; "Pressure mounts in Bonn to delay Emu," Financial Times, July 7, 1997; "Edmund 




























































































should not exceed 3% of the GDP was constructed as the benchmark by which 
the future quality of the Euro is being judged.
The irony is that the Federal government, particularly Chancellor Kohl and 
Finance Minister Theo Waigel, was now caught in its own rhetoric. Bonn had 
insisted on a rigid interpretation of the convergence criteria vis-à-vis its 
European partners in order to reassure a nervous German public and to 
guarantee that EU members institute the necessary austerity policies to meet the 
criteria. As a result, they reduced their own flexibility with regard to Germany 
meeting the criteria itself. Critics of the Euro such as Edmund Stoiber, the 
Prime Minister of Bavaria (CSU), and Gerhard Schroder, Prime Minister of 
Lower Saxony and a leading contender for the SPD’s candidate for the 
Chancellerie, routinely use references to Deutsche Mark patriotism in order do 
make their case.33 Both called for delaying entry into the third stage of EMU, 
but based their arguments on economic considerations regarding financial 
stability. However, Gerhard Schroder in particular tried to make it very clear 
that he remains a "good European" by arguing that "a controlled delay would 
not damage Europe."34
In sum, the German debate over the Euro can be analyzed as a contest of 
competing identities, Euro-patriotism versus Deutsche Mark patriotism. The 
former construction is much stronger among the political elites than the latter. 
First, as argued above, even those opposed to EMU do not dare touching the 
German consensus on European integration, but frame their criticism in terms of 
asking for a delay and/or demanding a strict application of the convergence 
criteria. In other words, they have to make sure that Deutsche Mark patriotism 
cannot be constructed as an alternative to German Europeanness. That German 
Euro-patriotism is the dominant identity construction becomes abundantly clear 
when one compares the German discourse with the British one. Note that "wait 
and see" is the trademark of Euro supporters in the UK, while it is the rallying 
cry of the opponents of a single currency in Germany.
Second, the strength of Euro-patriotism also explains largely why the German 
Social Democrats have rarely challenged the consensus on the single currency
33 On Stoiber's position see ”Es gab einmal eine europaische Bewegung in Deutschland ... das 
ist vorbei," Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nov. 2, 1993; "Stoiber beharrt auf Kritik an EWU," Süd­
deutsche Zeitung, June 23, 1997; "Edmund Stoiber: Defender of a decimal point," Financial 
Times, July 7, 1997. On Gerhard Schroder's position see, e.g., "Den besten Zeitpunkt suchen,” 
Die Zeit, June 6, 1997.




























































































in election campaigns inspite of ample opportunities," particularly during the 
1994 election year when both federal and state elections were conducted in 
Germany. Even though a majority of German public opinion was opposed to the 
single currency at the time, the SPD refrained from exploiting this sentiment for 
their own purposes. Gerhard Schroder who positions himself as the SPD 
candidate for Chancellorship in the 1998 federal elections, has remained a 
rather lonely voice in the party leadership with his Euro-skepticism.
Third and similar to the French case, the institutional setting of the German 
political system makes it hard for Euro-opponents to gather strength. Since they 
remain a minority in each of the major parties, coalition-building among them 
becomes rather difficult. Given the importance of party discipline in the German 
political context, it is very unlikely that opponents of a single currency might be 
able to form a coalition across party lines.
5. Conclusions
This paper argued that EMU and the Euro can only be understood as a political 
rather than a mostly economic project. While the economic advantages and 
disadvantages of a single currency are indeterminate, to say the least, and while 
its social consequences regarding cuts in the European welfare state are rather 
significant, at least in the short run, the project has become the cornerstone of 
European political integration. Support and opposition to EMU in the three 
countries investigated vary with regard to visions of European integration rather 
than economic considerations. If economic ideologies were all that mattered, we 
would expect strong support for EMU among British, French, and German 
neoliberals, i.e. among the British Conservatives, the French RPR, and parts of 
the German Christian Democrats. We would also expect stronger opposition 
against the Euro and the Maastricht convergence criteria among the European 
Social Democrats. The opposite is the case. The German SPD, to a lesser degree 
the French PSF, and even parts of British Labour are among the strongest 
supporters of EMU, while the neoliberal British Conservatives and - to a lesser 
extent - the French RPR remain deeply divided.
This paper argued that the Euro is about identity politics and political visions of 
Europe. Strong supporters of the project in all three countries join a common 
vision of European integration as overcoming the historical divisions of the 3
3S There have been two notable exceptions to this, the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 
1996 and in Hamburg in 1997. But opposition to the Euro didn't help much. The SPD lost 




























































































continent. While they might differ in details, they share the belief that the times 
of national solutions to economic, political, and social problems in Europe are 
definitely over. They use EMU and the single currency as a tool to get closer to 
that political vision. The Euro then symbolizes a collective European identity, 
while the Deutsche Mark, the franc and the Pound Sterling are constructed as 
the symbolic remnants of a nationalist past. At the same time, opponents of 
EMU use the Deutsche Mark, the Franc Français, and the Pound Sterling as 
symbols of national identities which are not to be sacrificed under some vague 
"Europeanness."
But collective identification with Europe comes in national colors. We are far 
from claiming in this paper that "Europe" means the same for everybody. The 
strongest identification with Europeanness can probably be found among the 
German political elites where "Euro-patriotism" forms part and parcel of the 
country's post-World War II national identity. Moreover, Europe's "other" in the 
German political discourse is constructed as the continent's and - more 
important - Germany's own past of wars and nationalist excesses. Since Europe 
is, thus, at the core of modem Germany's "post-nationalist identity," opponents 
of the Euro have a hard time to justify their cause. Deutsche Mark patriotism, 
while resonating well with German mass public opinion, does not represent a 
strong enough identity construction in the German elite discourse to effectively 
compete with "Europe."
The opposite is the case in Britain. English identity still constructs "Europe" as 
the "other" signifying the continent and, at the same time, entails notions of 
national sovereignty which are hard to reconcile with the institutional setup of 
EMU. As a result, supporters of the Euro in Britain face a similar uphill battle in 
the British elite discourse as its opponents do in Germany. "Wait and see" is 
then understood as potential support for a single currency in the British context, 
while it has become the battlecry of Euro-skeptics in Germany.
France occupies a middleground between these two extremes. On the one hand 
and similar to Britain, French identity politics has long been grounded in 
distinct nationalist constructions. While German nationalism has come to be 
identified with authoritarianism and militarism, French nationalism was long 
regarded as signifying republicanism, enlightenment, and the ensuing mission 
civilisatrice. We argued in this paper, however, that French distinctiveness 
Europeanized over the last 20 years in the elite discourse, since a purely 
nationalist identity construction was no longer tenable. But French 
Europeanness still looks very different from German Europeanness, since it 
essentially Europeanizes one's own understandings of the état-nation. Europe to 




























































































In sum then, our theoretical argument about collective identities which is 
grounded in Self-Categorization Theories, cultural sociology, and sociological 
institutionalism, holds up pretty well with the empirical data. Four problems 
remain to be addressed. First, how does the identity-based account presented 
here relate to more traditional explanations focussing on material and 
instrumental interests? As argued above, we do not intend to replace a 
monocausal interest-based account with an equally unidimensional identity 
explanation. Rather, the relationship between identities, interests, and 
preferences are at stake. With regard to both the British and the German cases, 
we claim that collective identities - Englishness as non-European, in one case, 
German Europeanness, in the other - largely influenced how political elites 
came to see their economic interests with regard to European integration in 
general and EMU in particular. In these two cases, the causal arrow seems to 
run from identities -> interests, with the latter reinforcing the former. Flere, 
collective identities appear to define the range of (economic and political) 
choices which actors regard as in their interest.
In the French case, however, we claim that a profound change in elite identities 
occured. It was triggered by "critical junctures" - the failure of Mitterrand's eco­
nomic policies in 1983 and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s - which 
profoundly challenged the political and economic interests of political elites. In 
this case then, a change in material and instrumental interests ultimately led to a 
change in collective identities, i.e., the causal arrow appears to go from interests 
-> identities, again with the latter reinforcing and stabilizing the former over 
time.
Second, how does our argument relate to the explanation concentrating on insti­
tutional path dependence discussed above? We claim that identity politics 
constitutes one causal mechanism by which institutional "lock-in" effects occur. 
The initial choice in favor of EMU was a deliberate decision by policy-makers 
heavily influenced by their visions of European political order which were in 
turn affected by their collective identities. These identities then insured that the 
national attitudes toward the Euro - British reluctance, French and German 
support - were locked in and that it became harder and harder for opponents of 
these national positions to make their case.
Third, our use of "critical junctures" remains problematic. It is hard to tell in 
advance what kind of external or internal events constitute "critical junctures" 
leading to changes in collective identities. In the French case, for example, we 
feel confident that both Mitterrand's policy failure in the early 1980s and the 
end of the Cold War represent such critical junctures which challenged 




























































































1992/3 did not lead to renewed arguments about French Europeanness, but 
rather re-inforced previously constructed identities and the ensuing attitudes 
toward the Euro? We do not have good theoretical tools to predict under what 
circumstances "critical junctures” are perceived challenging and changing 
collective identities.
Fourth, this paper's central weakness is probably its exclusive focus on elite 
discourses. But how can one talk about "national identity" and ignore the people 
who are the subject of such elite discourses? After all, identity constructions put 
forward by political elites are powerful tools by which policy-makers 
communicate with their electorate which is supposed to form the "imagined 
community" of a nation.36 While policy-makers cannot simply make up national 
identities, their use of collective identity constructions, of symbols and myths 
with which people identify, is a means to increase the legitimacy of their 
policies. This point is particularly salient in the German case where public and 
elite attitudes toward the Euro diverge. When Chancellor Kohl declares the 
Euro a question "of war and peace," he certainly attempts to communicate with 
mass public opinion. However, German mass public opinion remains deeply 
skeptical of the Euro. Does that mean that the German public does not share 
Chancellor Kohl's identity construction? This question which cannot be 
answered in this paper, is certainly worth further inquiry.
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